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Abstract 
Over the last years, the number of firms paying dividends has decreased and stock 
repurchases have emerged as an alternative form of payout with a crescent importance 
on payout structure. Therefore, we attempt to analyze the relation between payout 
structure and earnings management across G5 countries for the period from 2005 to 
2015. We measure earnings management based on a modified Jones (1991) abnormal 
accruals model. Our main findings suggest a negative association between earnings 
management and payout policy because payout policy can be used as a form of mitigate 
agency problems, however this relationship is stronger for dividends than for stock 
repurchases. In addition, this negative relationship is stronger for regular payouts and in 
firms from countries with weaker investor protection, which are countries more 
susceptible to agency problems. These findings are important for all users of information 
because the manipulation of earnings can have a huge impact on real economy and 
financial markets and because give new highlights in the choice between stock 
repurchases and dividends.   
Keywords:  
Earnings management, accruals, dividends, stock repurchases, investor protection. 
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Resumo 
Ao longo dos últimos anos, o número de empresas que pagam dividendos 
diminuiu e a recompra de ações surgiu como uma forma alternativa de pagamento com 
uma crescente importância na estrutura de pagamento. Sendo assim, o nosso principal 
objetivo é analisar a relação entre estrutura de pagamento e a gestão de resultados nos 
países pertencentes ao G5 para o período de 2005 a 2015. Estimamos a gestão de 
resultados com base num modelo de abnormal accruals de Jones (1991) modificado. 
Os nossos principais resultados sugerem uma relação negativa entre a gestão de 
resultados e a política de pagamentos, porque a política de pagamentos pode ser usada 
como uma forma de reduzir os problemas da agência, porém essa relação é mais forte 
para os dividendos do que para as recompras de ações. Além disso, essa relação negativa 
é mais forte para pagamentos regulares e em empresas de países com um nível de 
proteção dos investidores mais fraco, que são países mais suscetíveis a problemas de 
agência. Estes resultados são importantes para todos os utilizadores da informação, 
porque a manipulação de resultados pode ter um impacto enorme na economia real e 
nos mercados financeiros e porque dá novos destaques na escolha entre recompra de 
ações e dividendos.  
Palavras-chave:  
Gestão de resultados, accruals, dividendos, recompra de ações, proteção do investidor. 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings management has been widely studied over the years (Jones 1991; 
Defond & Jiambalvo 1994; Dechow et al. 1995; Teoh et al. 1998a, b; Dechow & Dichev 
2002; Francis et al. 2005; Kothari et al. 2005; Ball & Shivakumar 2006; Daniel et al. 
2008; Deng et al. 2017; He et al. 2017). In the context of agency conflicts between 
corporate insiders and minority shareholders, there is the possibility of corporate 
insiders manage earnings to extract private control benefits. Earnings management is 
important for all users of information and the manipulation of earnings can have a huge 
impact on real economy and financial markets. Recently, this issue has gained an 
additional importance due to the known cases of earnings manipulation.  
One important determinant of earnings management is dividend policy (Daniel et 
al. 2008; He et al. 2017). The related studies suggest that firms that pay dividends are 
less prone to manipulate earnings because dividends can be used as a form of mitigate 
agency conflicts (Deng et al. 2017; He et al. 2017). Dividends limit the opportunistic 
behavior of managers because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to pay 
cash dividends and because manages can use dividends to build a worthy reputation  
improving access to capital markets (La Porta et al. 2000).  
However, there is a global tendency to the reduction of firms paying dividends 
(Fatemi & Bildik 2012). This observed reduction of firms paying dividends is 
accompanied with a crescent importance of stock repurchases on payout structure 
(Skinner 2008; von Eije & Megginson 2008; Haw et al. 2011; Fatemi & Bildik 2012).  
Therefore, it is extremely important to compare these two forms of payout policy 
to address if they are complements or substitutes. The theory of the irrelevance of 
dividends to firm value is consistent with the substitution hypothesis (Miller & 
Modigliani 1961). Grullon and Michaely (2002) also support this hypothesis based on 
an analysis of the market reaction to dividends cuts.  The complementary hypothesis is 
defended by some studies that analyzed the impact on firm value (Haw et al. 2011) and 
the impact on reported losses and earnings persistence (Skinner & Soltes 2011).  
The principal goal of this dissertation is to make a detailed comparison of the 
impact of stock repurchases and dividends on earnings management activity. To our 
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knowledge, the focus on this objective fills a gap in the literature. Following He et al. 
(2017), this dissertation has two more objectives. First, we attempt to analyze the 
capacity of dividends to mitigate agency conflicts. Second, we compare G5 countries 
based on their degree of investor protection. This comparison is important because in 
countries with weaker investor protection corporate insiders have more facility to extract 
private control benefits, so these countries are more susceptible to agency conflicts.    
To estimate earnings management we use a modified Jones (1991) abnormal 
accruals model. Then, following He et al. (2017), we employ a OLS regression that 
attempts to analyze the relationship between earnings management and dividend and 
compare this relationships in countries with weaker or higher investor protection. We 
also modify this regression in order to make the detailed comparison between 
repurchases and dividends. In addition, based on the Skinner and Soltes (2011) division 
to study earnings persistence, we  analyze the impact in earnings management of divide 
firms into firms that make regular payouts and firms that make occasional payouts. To 
our knowledge, this division based on the frequency of payouts in order to compare 
them is also little analyzed in the earnings management studies.   
We employ these regressions for G5 countries over the period from 2005 to 2015. 
In this issue, this dissertation extends the previous literature that used different samples. 
G5 countries were select because are the five world's leading industrialized countries 
and have different classifications in terms of investor protection. Start the sample in 
2005 is important because is the year of the mandatory adoption of IFRS for listed firms 
in European Union countries that can have a negative impact on opportunities to manage 
earnings. This period of recent eleven years is also relevant because the earning 
management theme gained importance in the years of recent global financial crisis, 
which started in the United States in consequence of the collapse of subprime mortgage 
market in 2007. 
The main results are i) firms that pay dividends or make stock repurchases are less 
inclined to engage in earnings manipulations activities, but this association is stronger 
for dividends than repurchases; ii) Regular payouts are associated with less earnings 
manipulation than occasional payouts; iii) in civil law countries firms that pay dividends 
are less inclined to manage earnings but stock repurchases don´t have a significant 
impact on earnings management and iv) in common law countries there is a negative 
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association between this two forms of payout and earnings management that is more 
stronger for dividends than repurchases. 
The present dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of the related literature and formulate the main research hypotheses. Section 3 presents 
the data and methodology. Section 4 describes the univariate and multivariate results 
and some robustness tests of the empirical results. Finally, section 5 concludes the 
dissertation.   
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2. Literature review and research hypotheses 
The information provided by dividend policy has been widely studied over the 
years. Miller and Modigliani (1961) support that the dividend policy is irrelevant to firm 
value because firm value depends on firm´s capacity to generate operational results and 
not on how operational results are distributed. Another important line of thought is the 
dividend signaling theory (Bhattacharya 1979; Bhattacharya 1980; Miller & Rock 
1985). Accordingly to this theory, in context of information asymmetry dividends can 
be used as a financial signal of firm´s value.  
Some recent literature examined the theory of the information content of 
dividends in the context of the capacity of dividends to provide information about 
earning manipulation (Daniel et al. 2008; He et al. 2017) and about earnings quality 
(Skinner & Soltes 2011; Deng et al. 2017). Earnings management is a matter with a 
crescent importance because of a large number of known cases of earnings 
manipulation, which can have a huge impact on real economy and financial markets. 
One important example of these cases is the case of Lehman Brothers investment bank 
that culminated in his failure in September of 2008.  
The information asymmetry also rises the importance of dividends to resolve 
agency conflicts. In this context two agency models of dividends can be identified, the 
outcome model and the substitute model (La Porta et al. (2000)). The outcome model 
supports that minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to pay cash dividends, 
therefore limiting their opportunistic behavior. In turn, substitute model documents that 
managers can use dividends to build a worthy reputation on minority shareholders’ 
treatment with the objective of issue equity on future. In conclusion, the payment of 
cash dividends limits the opportunistic behavior of managers (Pinkowitz et al. 2006). 
Therefore, we expect find a negative association between dividend policy and earnings 
management (Deng et al. 2017; He et al. 2017).  
The discussion above led us to test the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Firms that pay dividends are less inclined to manage earnings.  
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There are various forms of payout policy like payment of cash dividends, payment 
of dividends on shares, fractionation of the number of shares and repurchase of stock.  
Recently, there has been an increase in stock repurchases and a decrease in 
dividend payments mainly in the U.S (Skinner 2008; Haw et al. 2011). This 
phenomenon of change in payout policy also occurred in Europe. von Eije and 
Megginson (2008) found that the number of European and U.S. firms paying dividends 
has decreased in recent years, but total real dividend payments increased and shares 
repurchases has a crescent importance as payout method both in U.S. and Europe. In 
addition, Fatemi and Bildik (2012) used a sample of 33 different countries to prove that 
this tendency of decline in payment of dividends is global.  
Therefore, some recent studies included stock repurchases as an alternative form 
of payout (Skinner 2008; Haw et al. 2011; Skinner & Soltes 2011; He et al. 2017). He 
et al. (2017) found in robustness tests that the negative relationship between dividend 
policy and earning management remains when stock repurchases are used as an 
alternative measure of payout policy.  However, to our knowledge none of these recent 
studies made a detailed comparison between the impact of repurchases is earnings 
management and the impact of dividends in earnings management.   
Consequently, is extremely important to do a similar analysis for shares 
repurchases and compare to the results obtained for dividends: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms that make repurchases are less inclined to manage earnings. 
This change on payout policy raised an important question: “Are dividends and 
share repurchases complements or substitutes?”. 
The complementarity or substitutability of these two forms of payout divides the 
studies into two different opinions. First, the theory of the irrelevance of dividends 
(Miller & Modigliani 1961) is compatible with the proposition of shares repurchases 
and dividends being perfect substitutes. Grullon and Michaely (2002) analyzed the 
market reaction to dividends cuts to confirms the substitution hypothesis.   
In opposition, several studies found that dividends and shares repurchases are not 
perfect substitutes based on firm´s value analysis (Haw et al. 2011) and on earnings 
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quality analysis (Skinner & Soltes 2011). Stock repurchases are not a perfect substitute 
of dividends because can be used by corporate insiders to extract private control benefits 
and are more flexible not involving such a commitment as dividends, therefore stock 
repurchases are less effective in resolve agency problems (Haw et al. 2011). Skinner 
and Soltes (2011) analyzed earnings persistent for five group of firms which are divided 
based on the frequency of payments (regular, occasional or no payment) and the type of 
payments (dividends and repurchases). These authors found that dividends and regular 
payouts are better signaling earnings quality. We expect to confirm that firms that make 
regular payouts are more effective in reducing agency problems because these firms 
have a historically greater commitment with minority shareholders, which limits their 
opportunistic behavior.  
These findings led us to the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 3: Firms that pay dividends are less inclined to manage earnings than 
firms that make repurchases. 
Hypothesis 4: Firms that make regular payouts are less inclined to manage 
earnings than firms that make occasional payouts. 
In the context of the agency problems, countries with weaker investor protection 
are more susceptible to agency conflicts because corporate insiders have more facility 
in extract private benefits because interests of minority shareholders are less protected. 
Pinkowitz et al. (2006) found that the impact of dividends on firm value is higher in 
countries with weaker investor protection. He et al. (2017) confirmed that dividend 
policy can be used to resolve agency conflicts because found a negative association 
between dividend policy and earning management, which is more pronounced in 
countries with weaker legal protection or low governance transparency.  
With the propose of confirm that dividends are used to resolve agency conflicts 
and agency problems are more susceptible to happen in countries with weaker investor 
protection, we test the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5: The negative relationship between firms that pay dividends to 
stockholders and earnings management is stronger in countries with weaker investor 
protection.   
 7 
 
As discussed above, literature suggests that stock repurchases are less effective in 
resolve agency problems than dividends (Haw et al. 2011; Skinner & Soltes 2011; He 
et al. 2017) and that in an environment with weaker investor protection the possibility 
of controlling shareholders use stocks repurchases for opportunistic behavior is greater 
(Haw et al. 2011). 
These findings suggest that the capacity of mitigate agency problems, principally 
in countries with weaker investor protection, is greater for dividends than stock 
repurchases, which led us to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 6: Firms that pay dividends are less inclined to manage earnings than 
firms that make repurchases, especially in countries with weaker investor protection.   
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1.  Data and sample 
The sample used in this study includes listed firms of G5 countries1 over the 2005-
2015 period. We used firms listed on the Euronext.liffe Paris, Deutsche Boerse AG, 
Tokyo, London, NASDAQ or NYSE. These five countries were selected because are 
the world's leading industrialized countries and have different classifications in terms of 
investor protection, which gives us a good sample for comparing countries.  
 The analysis of this sample period of eleven years is relevant to examine the 
effects of the changes in payout policy in recent years, especially because the earning 
management theme gained importance in the years of recent global financial crisis, 
which started in the United States in consequence of the collapse of subprime mortgage 
market in 2007. Start the sample in 2005 is also important because this is the year of 
mandatory adoption of IFRS for listed firms in European Union countries. This event is 
an important step in financial reporting convergence, which improves the comparability 
between European countries. Potentially, with this mandatory adoption of IFRS, 
European countries will have fewer opportunities to manage earnings than Japan and 
United States.  
The focus on these five developed countries and the period of recent eleven years 
extends the previous literature that used different samples.   
The main source of data was Thomson Reuters Datastream database. The initial 
sample covered 31977 firms. Following exclusion criteria from related studies, we first 
excluded all firms with missing data for DS Mnemonic Code reducing the sample to 
20255 firms. Second, we excluded all utilities (SIC codes 49) and financial firms (SIC 
codes 60-67) because these sectors have specific regulations, resulting in a sample of 
14348 firms. We also excluded all observations with missing data for SIC Code, 
resulting in a sample of 13338 firms.  
                                                 
1 G-5 countries are the following principal developed countries: France, Germany, Japan, United 
Kingdom and United States.  
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After these criteria, it still exists various firms of our sample that have no data for 
all variables in all of the years. Thus, in order to avoid exclude too many firms, we 
defined as a minimum criteria to include the firms in our sample that they must have at 
least 4 years of complete data. Consequently, the sample reduces to 4848 firms.  
Finally, after a critical analysis of the outliers of the sample and of the subsample 
of each country, we excluded those firms who have extreme values without an 
empirically logical explanation found. Therefore, the final sample comprises 4652 
firms.   
3.2. Earnings management  
3.2.1. Discretionary accruals 
Reported earnings reflect cash flow from operations and accounting adjustments 
that delay or anticipate the reported of realized or to be realized cash flows. These 
accounting adjustments are the so-called accruals. Total accruals are divided into normal 
accruals (non-discretionary accruals) and abnormal accruals (discretionary accruals) 
(Jones 1991). Normal accruals reflect the effects of economic conditions on total 
accruals and discretionary accruals reflect the estimation errors of accruals (Jones 1991; 
Dechow & Dichev 2002). For example, if the cash receipt of a previously recognized 
revenue in accounts receivable is less than the original estimate, in the moment of the 
reversion of the accrual in the next period, the cash collected is less than the record 
reversed in accounts receivable and the difference between them is the estimation error. 
These estimation errors can be intentional or unintentional (Dechow & Dichev 2002). 
Francis et al. (2005) argues that the discretionary component of accruals is 
affected by three subcomponents, the performance component, the opportunistic 
component and the pure noise. First, the performance component reflects the efforts of 
managers to provide the correct information about earnings to the market. Second, the 
opportunistic component reflects the ability of managers to manipulate earnings upward 
or downward. For last, the pure noise is related with the unintentional estimation errors.   
Total accruals regression residuals is a measure that has been widely used in the 
literature to capture earnings management (Jones 1991; Defond & Jiambalvo 1994; 
Dechow et al. 1995; Teoh et al. 1998a, b; Kothari et al. 2005; Daniel et al. 2008; Deng 
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et al. 2017; He et al. 2017). This is a measure of the abnormal accruals, a positive value 
indicates a manipulation of earnings upward and a negative value indicate a reduction 
of earnings through manipulation. Therefore, the higher the absolute value of abnormal 
accruals the greater earnings management.  
The Jones (1991) abnormal accruals model and modified versions of Jones (1991) 
are the most popular models to capture earnings management (Defond & Jiambalvo 
1994; Dechow et al. 1995; Teoh et al. 1998a, b; Kothari et al. 2005; Ball & Shivakumar 
2006; Daniel et al. 2008; He et al. 2017). Jones (1991) model explain the variation of 
total accruals in a given year as being related with change on revenues and gross 
property, plant and equipment. These two variables are related with the effect of changes 
on economic conditions on total accruals. Gross property, plant and equipment controls 
to the part of total accruals related with nondiscretionary depreciation expenses and 
revenues are a reliable control for firm´s performance prior to earnings management.  
Jones (1991) referred the possibility of earnings manipulation through credit sales. 
Therefore, several authors modified Jones (1991) model by introducing a variable that 
capture change in credit sales (Dechow et al. 1995; Teoh et al. 1998a, b). Dechow et al. 
(1995) compared the performance of five different models and concluded for the highest 
performance of a version of modified Jones (1991) that augmented the traditional model 
with the possibility of earnings manipulation through credit sales. 
Jones (1991) and modified Jones (1991) models are mis-specified when applied 
to samples with extreme performance (Dechow et al. 1995). In order to control for the 
correlation between accruals and performance, Kothari et al. (2005) modified Jones 
(1991) model by introducing the variable ROA.  
In relation to the heteroscedasticity problem, Jones (1991) reduced 
heteroscedasticity by scaling all variables, including the constant term, by lagged total 
assets. Kothari et al. (2005) introduced an additional control for heteroscedasticity 
including a constant not scaled by total assets in Jones (1991) model  and concluded for 
a better specification of the model.  
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Based on authors mentioned above, we estimate a modified cross-sectional2 
version of Jones (1991) model based on Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) 
contributions:  
Where TAccri.t is a variable for total accruals in year t for firm i and is measured 
as: 
TAccri,t = (∆Current Assetsi,t - ∆Cashi,t) - ∆Current Liabilitiesi,t –  
– Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization Expensei,t3             
and where ∆ is the change of the variable between period t and t-1.  
The explanatory variables of the model are ∆REVi,t , ∆RECi,t, PPEi,t and ROAi,t-1. 
∆REVi,t is the change in a firm´s revenue defined as revenues in year t less revenues in 
year t-1, ∆RECi,t is the change in a firm´s net receivables which is measured as net 
receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1, PPEi,t is net property, plant and 
equipment4 in year t for firm i and ROAi,t-1 is calculated as net income for firm i in year 
t-1 scaled by total assets for fim i in year t-1.  εi,t  represents the error term. In order to 
reduce heteroscedasticity, all variables are scaled by lagged total assets (Ai,t-1).  
                                                 
2 We use the cross-sectional version of Jones (1991) model, which is widely used and has given 
good results in terms of explanatory power (Defond & Jiambalvo 1994; Teoh et al. 1998a, b; Kothari et 
al. 2005; Ball & Shivakumar 2006; Daniel et al. 2008). We opted for the cross-sectional version of Jones 
(1991) model because this adjust automatically for the industry-specific economic changes that have an 
impact on total accruals, regardless of the impact of earnings management. Ball and Shivakumar (2006) 
compared the cross-sectional regression and the polled regression and concluded for the best explanatory 
power of the first, measured by the R2.  
3 The formula mentioned by Jones (1991) is the following: TAccri,t=(∆Current Assetsi,t - ∆Cashi,t)-
(∆Current Liabilitiesi,t-∆Current Portion of Long-term Debti,t-∆Income Taxes Payablei,t)- Depreciation, 
Depletion and Amortization Expensei,t. But due to data limitations the variables Current maturities of 
long-term debt and Income taxes payable were not used in Jones (1991) study. As we verify the same data 
limitation we also don´t include these variables in the formula.  
4 As Kothari et al. (2005), we use the net value of property, plant and equipment.  
TAccri,t/Ai,t-1 = β0 + β1*(1/Ai,t-1) + β2*((∆REVi,t -∆ RECi,t) /Ai,t-1 + 
+ β3*(PPEi.t/Ai,t-1) + β4*ROAi.t-1 + εi,t 
(1) 
(2) 
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The absolute values of the residuals of equation (1) is a measure for abnormal 
accruals.  
Each regression is estimated using OLS and separately for each industry and year 
(Defond & Jiambalvo 1994; Teoh et al. 1998a, b; Kothari et al. 2005; Ball & 
Shivakumar 2006; Daniel et al. 2008) and industries are grouped by the 12 Fama and 
French (1997) industry classification codes5.  
3.2.2. Earnings management- payout policy relationship  
The analysis of the relationship between earnings management and payout policy 
is divided into two, one analysis for dividend policy and other for firms that make stock 
repurchases.  
Following He et al. (2017), we estimated the below regression to assess the 
relationship between earnings management and dividend policy:  
Where ACCRi,t is a measure for earnings management for firm i in year t. This 
measure is obtained from the absolute values of the residuals of the equation (1). In turn, 
DIVi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm i pays dividends in year t, and 0 
otherwise and Xi (i=1,…,N) are the firm-specific control variables. Fixed effects 
represent the fixed effects for country, industry and year and εi,t  represents the error 
term. We run the Hausman test and reject the null hypothesis that the random effects is 
adequate, so confirm that fixed effects should be included in the model. We include 
industry fixed effect because, as referred above, in earnings management models is 
essential to address for industry-specific economic changes that can have a significant 
impact on total accruals. We also introduce dummy variables to capture the differences 
                                                 
5 Fama and French (1997) divide industries into the following 12 classifications: 1. Consumer 
nondurables, that includes food, tobacco, textile, apparel, leather and toys companies; 2. Consumer 
durables, which includes car, TV´s, furniture and household appliances companies; 3. Manufacturing, 
that includes machinery, trucks, planes, paper and printing companies; 4. Energy, which includes oil 
companies, gas and coal extraction and products companies; 5. Chemicals and Allied Products; 6. 
Business equipment, that includes computers, software and electronic equipment companies; 7. 
Telephone and television transmission; 8. Utilities; 9. Wholesale, retail and some services; 10. Healthcare, 
medical equipment and drugs; 11. Financial firms and 12. Other.   
ACCRi,t = β1 + β2*DIVi,t  +  ∑iNβit*Xit + Fixed Effects + εi,t+1 (3) 
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between countries of our sample that can affect earnings management activities, 
especially the differences between investor protection degrees that are studied too in this 
dissertation. Following He et al. (2017), we estimate all regressions using OLS.  
To confirm hypothesis 1, we expect β2 to be negative and statistically significant 
meaning that firms that pay dividends are less prone to manage earnings.  
With the purpose to do the same analysis for firms that make stock repurchases, 
we estimated the following regression:  
All variables and specifications are similar to those in model 3, except DIVi,t 
which is replaced by REPi,t. REPi,t is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm 
makes stock repurchases in year t, and 0 otherwise6.  
To confirm hypothesis 2, we expect β2 to be negative and statistically significant 
meaning that firms that make repurchases are less inclined to manage earnings.  
In addition, we include the two key explanatory variables, DIV and REP, in the 
same model to compare their coefficients:  
If the absolute value of β2 is larger than the absolute value of β3 and both values 
are negative, firms that pay dividends are less likely to manage earnings than firms that 
make stock repurchases, which is consistent with hypothesis 3.  
                                                 
6 The variable used as a proxy for repurchases activity represents the funds spent on reducing 
outstanding shares of common or preferred stock. This variable includes other types of activities like 
purchase of treasury shares and conversion of preferred stock into common stock, so repurchases activity 
can be overestimated. However, Haw et al. (2011) compared this variable with a sample manually 
collected of repurchases disclosed and concluded for a good correlation between these two variables, 
therefore they also used the funds spent on reducing outstanding shares of common or preferred stock as 
a proxy for stock repurchases.   
ACCRi,t = β1 + β2*REPi,t + ∑iNβit*Xit + Fixed Effects + εi,t+1 (4) 
ACCRi,t = β1 + β2*DIVi,t + β3*REPi,t + ∑iNβit*Xit + Fixed Effects + εi,t+1 (5) 
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3.2.3.  Repurchases Versus Dividends- more detailed analysis  
Based on the methodology of Skinner and Soltes (2011), we divide firms based 
on payout policy: 
1. Firms that pay regular dividends (REG_DIV); 
2. Firms that pay occasional dividends (OCCAS_DIV); 
3. Firms that make regular repurchases (REG_REP); 
4. Firms that make occasional repurchases (OCCAS_REP). 
Then, we consider that firms pay regular dividends if pay dividends every years 
of the sample and make regular stock repurchases if they do it in at least half of the 
years. Firms make occasional stock repurchases or pay occasional dividends if they do 
not it in a regular way.   
Second, we estimate the model (5) excluding variables Div and Rep and including 
the following dummy variables: REG_DIV, OCCAS_DIV, REG_REP and 
OCCAS_REP:  
We expect earnings management to be higher as we move from the estimates to 
the regular payouts to occasional payouts, therefore confirming the hypothesis 4.  In 
order to reinforcing the hypothesis 3, we expect that earnings management to be lower 
for firms that pay regular dividends than firms that make regular repurchases and for 
firms that pay occasional dividends than firms that make occasional repurchases. 
3.2.4. Investor protection and earnings management- payout policy 
relationship 
As referred by (La Porta et al. 2000), countries with common law legal tradition 
have, on average, stronger shareholder protection. This finding can also be observed on 
table 1. Table 1 shows the classification of each one  of the sample countries in terms 
of two measures, legal tradition of the country (Porta et al. 1998) and anti-director rights 
index (Porta et al. 1998). Civil law countries (France, Germany and Japan) have lower 
values of anti-director rights (3, 1 e 4, respectively) than common law countries (United 
ACCRi,t = β1 + β2*REG_DIVi,t + β3*OCCAS_DIVi,t + β4*REG_REPi,t + 
+β5*OCCAS_REPi,t +  ∑iNβit*Xit +Fixed Effects + εi,t+1 
(6) 
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Kingdom and United States which have the value 5), confirming that common law 
countries have, on average, stronger shareholder protection.  
Therefore, civil law countries are generally countries with weaker investor 
protection, so we expect that the negative relationship between firms that pay dividends 
to stockholders and earnings management to be stronger in these countries because 
dividends are used to resolve agency conflicts and agency problems are more 
susceptible to happen in these countries. 
With the propose of confirm the referred above, confirming the hypothesis 5, we 
estimated the following model:  
Where, LAW is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firm is from a 
civil law country and zero otherwise. To confirm the hypothesis 5, we expect that the 
absolute value of β2 to be higher than the absolute value of β3 and both have a negative 
signal.  
Table 1: Investor protection 
Country Legal traditions (Porta et al. 1998)  Anti-director rights (Porta et al. 1998) 
France French civil law  3 
Germany German civil law 1 
Japan German civil law 4 
UK English Common law 5 
US English Common law 5 
This table presents the classification of each one of the sample countries in terms of two measures, legal 
tradition of the country (Porta et al. 1998) and anti-director rights index (Porta et al. 1998). The legal 
tradition of the country distinguishes the countries based on common law origin or civil law origin. The 
anti-director rights index ranges from 1 to 6 and higher values of the index mean higher investor 
protection.  
 
In relation to the comparison between firms that pay dividends and firms that 
make repurchases and the possibility of the difference between them, in relation of the 
effectiveness in resolving agency conflicts to be higher in countries with weaker 
investor protection because in these countries the possibility of controlling shareholders 
ACCRi,t = β1 + β2*(LAW i,t*DIV i,t) + β3*((1-LAWi,t)*DIV i,t)  + 
+∑iNβit*Xit + Fixed Effects + εi,t+1 
(7) 
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use stocks repurchases for opportunistic behavior is greater (Haw et al. 2011), we 
employ the following regression:  
Therefore, to confirm the hypotheses 6, we expect that the absolute value of the 
difference between β2 and β3 to be higher than the absolute value of the difference 
between β3 and β4 and that these differences be positives in absolute value meaning that 
firms that pay dividends are less inclined to manage earnings than firms that make 
repurchases, especially in countries with weaker investor protection.   
3.2.5. Firm-specific control variables  
The models 3 to 8 mentioned above include control variables. These variables 
have the purpose of control for firm characteristics than can affect earning management. 
In this section, we provide a descriptive analysis of firm-specific control variables. The 
definition of all variables and their expect sign is presented in Appendix A- Table A1.  
Lagged abnormal accruals (ACCR(-1)) is  a control variable measured as the 
lagged value of abnormal accruals obtained from model (1). These measure controls for 
the possibility of earnings management to be related with past earnings management 
and the omission of this variable can affect our results. We expect a positive sign for 
this variable confirming a positive association between past earnings management  and 
present earnings management, which is consistent with a tendency for engage in 
earnings management activities that may be smaller or larger for each company (He et 
al. 2017).  
Another variable used is Firm size (SIZE). In the related studies, there are two 
measures of firm size, market capitalization and total assets. He et al. (2017) found a 
strong correlation between total assets and market capitalization, so used only the log of 
market capitalization in analysis, but in robustness tests found that results remain 
unchanged using total assets. We expect to obtain results similar to the related studies, 
so we propose a negative signal for the coefficient of this variable in earnings 
management model (Daniel et al. 2008; Deng et al. 2017; He et al. 2017). These 
expected results suggest that bigger firms are less prone to manage earnings.  This 
ACCRi,t = β1 + β2*(LAWi,t*DIVi,t) + β3*(LAWi,t*REPi,t) +  
+ β4*((1-LAWi,t)*DIV i,t) +  β5*((1-LAWi,t)*REP i,t)  + ∑iNβit*Xit + Fixed Effects + εi,t+1 
   
(8) 
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expected result is consistent with larger firms having generally more audit quality 
avoiding earnings management activities that distort financial statements and having 
usually more reputation in market, so the potential costs of losing reputation due to 
earnings management are greater.  
The variable Book-to-market equity ratio (BM) is widely used on the related 
literature. The results of prior studies suggest a negative relationship between Book-to-
market equity ratio and earnings management (Deng et al. 2017; He et al. 2017). 
However, Daniel et al. (2008) don´t found a significant relation between discretionary 
total accruals and market-to-book ratio. This measure may be interpreted as a proxy to 
grow opportunities, with higher values meaning lower growth opportunities and lower 
values meaning the opposite (Li & Kuo 2017). Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that 
firms with more growth opportunities (lower BM) have more information asymmetry 
problems, which increases agency problems. Therefore, as referred above, in firms 
with more agency problems managers have more incentives to manage earnings to 
extract private control benefits. In conclusion, we expect a negative sign for this 
variable in earnings management model. These expected results are consistent with 
firms with lower Book-to-market equity ratio being more prone to manage earnings. 
The growth of revenues is another important control variable. Revenues growth 
(REV_GROWTH) is measured as revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 scaled by 
revenues in year t-1. He et al. (2017) used this control variable in earnings management 
model and found a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Taking into account 
the results mentioned above, we can predict a positive relationship between the growth 
of revenues and earnings management. These predicted results suggest that firms with 
more growth of revenue are more associated to earnings management activities. This 
result is expected because firms with more revenues growth have more incentives to 
manage earnings in order to reduce earnings before taxes for reduce tax burden.  
To capture the age of the firm we introduced a variable, Firm age (AGE), 
measured as the number of years since a firm is included in Datastream. We expect 
similar results to the related literature, suggesting that older firms are less prone to 
manage earnings (Deng et al. 2017; He et al. 2017) because in older firms generally the 
agency conflicts have already been resolved or reduced, therefore managers are less 
prone to manage earnings to extract private control benefits.  
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The variable Leverage (LEVERAGE) has conflicting results on the related 
studies. He et al. (2017) used a sample of 29 countries and found a negative sign for this 
variable in earnings management model. In opposition, Deng et al. (2017) found a 
significant positive sign using a sample of Chinese listed firms. Daniel et al. (2008) used 
a sample of S&P 1500 listed firms and don´t found a statistically significant coefficient.  
We believe that firms with higher leverage have managers less concerned with built a 
worthy reputation in equity market, so this firms have more agency conflicts which 
increases the incentives to earnings manipulation. But the negative sign is also 
empirically correct because debt contracts generally have covenants that can restrict 
earnings manipulation.   
 We introduced the variable Return on assets (ROA) with the goal of analyses the 
impact of firm´s profitability. For the coefficient of this variable the related studies have 
again contradictory results using different samples, using a sample of Chinese listed 
firms the coefficient is positive and statistically significant (Deng et al. 2017) and have 
the opposite signal using a sample of 29 countries or a subsample of the US firms (He 
et al. 2017). We conclude for a negative sign because is the sign obtained in the study 
with the most complete sample7 (29 countries) (He et al. 2017), suggesting that more 
profitable firms are less likely to manage earnings.  
For last, we introduced the variable Closely-held ownership (CO). This variable 
represents the fraction of shares closely held by insiders and controlling shareholders. 
He et al. (2017) found a positive and statistically significant association between this 
variable and earnings management. Therefore, we predict a positive signal for this 
variable proposing that the shares closely held by insiders and controlling shareholders 
increase agency conflicts. 
                                                 
7 He et al. (2017) used a very complete sample to analyses the impact of dividend policy on 
earnings management across 29 countries. The sample includes 18 developed countries (Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.) and 11 emerging markets (China, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and 
Turkey). As we can see, their sample includes the five developed countries used in the present dissertation, 
so the results obtained in their work are a very reliable source for the selection of our variables and the 
prevision of their signs.  
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We also introduced a variable that attempts to capture the impact of long-term 
tangible assets. This variable is measured as net property, plant and equipment scaled 
by total assets (PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS) and based on related researches we hope to find 
a negative association between the magnitude of long-term tangible assets and the 
propensity of manage earnings (He et al. 2017).  
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4. Results 
This section presents the results. First, present the results of univariate analysis, 
which includes the analysis of the composition of the sample, the summary statistic and 
the correlation matrix. Second, present the results of the estimation of our models. 
Finally, some robustness tests are described.  
4.1. Univariate analysis 
The composition of our final sample by country and industry is described on table 
2 and table 3, respectively.  
For comparison purposes, the composition of our sample is sufficiently balanced 
between common law and civil low countries, as we can see on table 2 (firms in civil 
law countries represent approximately 45.77% of the total sample and in common law 
countries approximately 54.23%).  
Around 6.96% of the firms of the sample are from France; 5.48% from Germany; 
33.32% from Japan; 21.9% from United Kingdom and 32.22% from United States.  
 Table 2: Sample composition by country 
Country Nº firms % 
Civil law countries   
France 324 6.96 
Germany 255 5.48 
Japan 1550 33.32 
Total 2129 45.77 
Common law countries   
UK 1019 21.90 
US 1504 32.33 
Total 2523 54.23 
Total 4652 100 
This table presents the sample composition by country in absolute value (the 
number of firms in each country) and in relative value (the percentage of firm 
in each country in relation of the total sample). The total of absolute and 
relative values are presented on the end of the table. The total of absolute and 
relative values are also presented for civil law countries (France, Germany 
and Japan) and for common law countries (United Kingdom and United 
States).  
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In relation to the composition of the sample by industry (table 3), the industries 
with more firms are industry 12 (other), 6 (Business equipment), 3 (Manufacturing) and 
9 (Wholesale, retail and some services) with 998 firms (approximately 21.45% of the 
total sample), 919 firms (approximately 19.75% of the total sample), 691 firms 
(14.85%) and 604 firms (12.98%), respectively. Then, by descending order are the 
industry 10 (Healthcare, medical equipment and drugs), 1 (Consumer nondurables), 5 
(Chemicals and allied products), 2 (Consumer durables), 4 (Energy) and 7 (Telephone 
and television transmission), with 392 firms (approximately 8.43% of the total sample), 
362 firms (approximately 7.78% of the total sample), 206 firms (4.43%), 197 firms 
(4.23%), 187 firms (4.02%) and 96 firms (2.06%), respectively.  
Table 3: Sample composition by 12 Fama and 
French (1997) industry classifications codes 
Industry Nº firms % 
1 362 7.78 
2 197 4.23 
3 691 14.85 
4 187 4.02 
5 206 4.43 
6 919 19.75 
7 96 2.06 
9 604 12.98 
10 392 8.43 
12 998 21.45 
Total 4652 100.0 
This table presents the sample composition by 12 Fama and French (1997) industry classifications codes 
in absolute value (the number of firms in each industry) and in relative value (the percentage of firm in 
each industry in relation of the total sample). Fama and French (1997) divides industries into the 
following 12 classifications: 1. Consumer nondurables, that includes food, tobacco, textile, apparel, 
leather and toys companies; 2. Consumer durables, which includes car, TV´s, furniture and household 
appliances companies; 3. Manufacturing, that includes machinery, trucks, planes, paper and printing 
companies; 4. Energy, which includes oil companies, gas and coal extraction and products companies; 
5. Chemicals and Allied Products; 6. Business equipment, that includes computers, software and 
electronic equipment companies; 7. Telephone and television transmission; 8. Utilities; 9. Wholesale, 
retail and some services; 10. Healthcare, medical equipment and drugs; 11. Financial firms and 12. 
Other. The sectors 8. Utilities and 11.Financial firms are not presented on this table because we excluded 
them of the sample because these sectors have specific regulations. The total of absolute and relative 
values are presented on the end of the table. 
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The summary statistics of our key variables are reported on table 4. The statistics 
generally coincide with the results of related studies (Francis et al. 2005; Deng et al. 
2017; He et al. 2017).  
However, it is important to mention some results. In relation to ACCR, the values 
obtained are consistent with Deng et al. (2017) and He et al. (2017), except for the 
standard deviation (0.2352) which is bigger meaning that is more dispersion of values 
around the mean. DIV values are all consistent with related literature (Deng et al. 2017) 
and mean of DIV (0.6269) is higher than mean of REP (0.4573), which means that are 
more payments of dividends than stock repurchases. SIZE values are consistent with 
previous works (Francis et al. 2005; Deng et al. 2017) but standard deviation (2.1721) 
is slightly bigger (Deng et al. 2017). Relatively to REV_GROWTH the values of mean, 
median and standard deviation (the values of mean, median and standard deviation are 
59.8444%, 4.8779% and 2971.858, respectively) are bigger than values obtained in 
related works (Francis et al. 2005; He et al. 2017), meaning that on average the firms of 
our sample have higher values for revenues growth and the values are more disperse 
around the mean.  
Finally, the mean of ROA is negative (-0.0292) which is inconsistent with Deng 
et al. (2017) and Francis et al. (2005) but is supported with the results obtained by He 
et al. (2017). This negative value means that on average the firms of the sample have a 
negative return on assets due to a negative net income. The value of standard deviation 
(0.7806) of this variable is slightly higher in comparison with related studies (Deng et 
al. 2017; He et al. 2017). 
In order to study the relationship between the variables and detect potential 
multicollinearity problems the correlation matrix, presented on table 5, was analyzed. 
The correlation between all variables has the expected sign. The dependent variable of 
our models, ACCR is negatively correlated with dividends and accruals, which is 
consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. ACCR is also negatively correlated with SIZE, BM, 
AGE, PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS, ROA, OCCAS_DIV, REG_DIV and REG_REP. In 
relation to the remaining variables, REV_GROWTH, LEVERAGE, CO, NO_DIV, 
NO_REP and OCCAS_REP, are positively correlated with ACCR.  
Generally, the correlation coefficients have low values suggesting that are no 
collinearity issues. The most concerning value is the highest correlation between 
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REG_REP and REP (0.6431), which is not a problem because the strong correlation 
between these variables is normal and this variables are not included in the same model. 
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   Table 4: Summary statistics 
    ACCR DIV REP SIZE BM REV_GROWTH AGE LEVERAGE PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS ROA CO OCCAS_DIV OCCAS_REP REG_DIV REG_REP LAW 
 Mean 0.0999 0.6269 0.4573 12.8443 0.8532 59.8444 25.1090 0.5194 0.2534 -0.0292 33.3380 0.4043 0.3942 0.3579 0.3882 0.4577 
 
Median 
0.0483 1.0000 0.0000 12.8748 0.6528 4.8779 22.0000 0.4939 0.2100 0.0307 30.4400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Std. 
Dev. 
0.2352 0.4836 0.4982 2.1721 2.2677 2971.8580 12.5638 1.7256 0.2090 0.7806 24.1695 0.4908 0.4887 0.4794 0.4873 0.4982 
 Obs. 41948 56066 54134 56185 54015 51662 60476 56174 56041 56168 51187 60476 60476 60476 60476 60476 
This table presents the summary statistics of our sample for the relevant variables: ACCR (measure of earnings management), DIV (dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm pay cash dividends, and 0 otherwise), REP 
(dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm makes stock repurchases, and 0 otherwise), SIZE (firm size), BM (Book-to-market equity ratio), REV_GROWTH (revenues growth), AGE (firm age), LEVERAGE (firm leverage 
ratio), PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS (long-term tangible assets), ROA (return on assets), CO (Closely-held ownership), OCCAS_DIV (dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm pay occasional dividends, and 0 otherwise), 
OCCAS_REP (dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm makes occasional repurchases, and 0 otherwise), REG_DIV (dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm pay regular dividends, and 0 otherwise), REG_REP (dummy 
that takes the value 1 if the firm makes regular repurchases, and 0 otherwise) and  LAW (dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firms is from a civil law country and zero otherwise). The summary statistics 
presented are mean (mean values of the variables), median (median values of the variables), Std. Dev. (standard deviation of the variables) and Obs. (the number of observations).  
     Table 5: Correlation matrix  
    
ACCR DIV REP SIZE BM REV_GROWTH AGE LEVERAGE 
PPE/TOTAL_ 
ASSETS 
ROA CO OCCAS_DIV OCCAS_REP REG_DIV REG_REP LAW 
ACCR 1.0000 
               
DIV -0.2138 1.0000 
              
REP -0.1302 0.2860 1.0000 
             
SIZE -0.2196 0.3988 0.3463 1.0000 
            
BM -0.0475 0.0683 -0.0007 0.0129 1.0000 
           
REV_GROWTH 0.0260 -0.0239 -0.0158 -0.0202 0.0036 1.0000 
          
AGE -0.1615 0.3418 0.2459 0.4054 0.0436 -0.0199 1.0000 
         
LEVERAGE 0.0930 -0.0018 -0.0363 0.0893 -0.1540 -0.0062 0.0799 1.0000         
PPE/TOTAL_ 
ASSETS 
-0.1267 0.1786 0.0533 0.2330 0.0853 0.0008 0.1460 0.0863 1.0000        
ROA -0.2394 0.1780 0.1146 0.2246 0.0512 -0.0034 0.1030 -0.3787 0.0474 1.0000 
      
CO 0.0106 0.0573 -0.1341 -0.3007 0.1152 -0.0005 -0.1875 -0.0106 0.0419 0.0048 1.0000 
     
OCCAS_DIV -0.0250 -0.0100 -0.0813 -0.0567 0.0098 -0.0081 -0.0603 0.0871 0.0274 0.0572 0.0818 1.0000 
    
OCCAS_REP 0.0231 -0.0901 -0.2767 -0.1113 -0.0172 -0.0037 -0.1968 0.0148 -0.0165 0.0062 0.0520 0.1400 1.0000 
   
REG_DIV -0.1584 0.5942 0.2750 0.3636 0.0632 -0.0154 0.3311 -0.0464 0.1369 0.1139 -0.0016 -0.6636 -0.1698 1.0000 
  
REG_REP -0.1341 0.3009 0.6431 0.3878 0.0077 -0.0156 0.3254 -0.0418 0.0570 0.1141 -0.1578 -0.1425 -0.6784 0.3599 1.0000 
 
LAW -0.1654 0.4187 0.1810 0.2057 0.1540 -0.0183 0.2158 0.0194 0.1283 0.0853 0.3258 -0.0345 -0.0883 0.3638 0.2072 1.0000 
This table presents the correlation matrix of our sample for the relevant variables: ACCR (measure of earnings management), DIV (dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm pay cash dividends, and 0 otherwise), REP 
(dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm makes stock repurchases, and 0 otherwise), SIZE (firm size), BM (Book-to-market equity ratio), REV_GROWTH (revenues growth), AGE (firm age), LEVERAGE (firm leverage 
ratio), PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS (long-term tangible assets), ROA (return on assets), CO (Closely-held ownership), OCCAS_DIV (dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm pay occasional dividends, and 0 otherwise), 
OCCAS_REP (dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm makes occasional repurchases, and 0 otherwise), REG_DIV (dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm pay regular dividends, and 0 otherwise), REG_REP (dummy 
that takes the value 1 if the firm makes regular repurchases, and 0 otherwise) and  LAW (dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firms is from a civil law country and zero otherwise). 
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4.2. Multivariate analysis 
In this subsection, we analyze the results of the estimations of our models. First, we 
analyze the relation between payout policy and earnings management. Second, we do a 
more detailed analysis of the two forms of payout, dividends and repurchases, and of the 
frequency of payouts. At last, we assess the impact of the investor protection in countries 
in the relationship between payout policy and earnings management.  
In table 6, we analyze the relationship between payout policy and earnings 
management. Column 1 focus on the relationship between dividends and earnings 
management. The results confirm a negative statistically significant relationship between 
DIV and ACCR (-0.0746).  In conclusion, this result confirms that firms that pay 
dividends are less prone to manage earnings (hypothesis 1), which is consistent with He 
et al. (2017) results. In column 2, we introduce the firms specific control variables and 
there is again evidence of the negative relationship between dividends and earnings 
management (-0.0314), supporting the hypothesis 1.  
Column 3 of table 6 analysis the repurchases and column 4 differs from 3 because 
includes the firm-specific control variables. Columns 3 and 4 focus on the relationship 
between repurchases and earnings management and conclude for a significant negative 
association between them (-0.0360 in column 3 and -0.0107 in column 4). These results 
give support to the hypothesis 2, so firms that make repurchases are less inclined to 
manage earnings. He et al. (2017) used, in robustness tests, repurchases as an alternative 
form of payout policy and also find a negative sign between repurchases and earnings 
management.   
In relation to the columns 5 and 6 of table 6 the objective is compare repurchases 
and dividends in terms of capacity to resolve agency conflicts. The column 6 is more 
complete than column 5 because includes the control variables. The conclusion is the 
same in columns 5 and 6, the absolute value of the coefficient associated to DIV is bigger 
than the absolute value of the coefficient of REP and both coefficients are negatives and 
statistically significant (in column 5 the coefficient of DIV is -0.0697 and the coefficient 
of REP is -0.0220; in column 6 the coefficient of DIV is -0.0307 and the coefficient of 
REP is -0.0074). These findings mean that firms that pay dividends are less prone to 
manage earnings than firms that make stock repurchases, so are more effective in resolve 
agency conflicts, which leads to the confirmation of hypothesis 3.  Skinner and Soltes 
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(2011) compared the impact of repurchases and dividends on earnings persistence and 
also found better results for firms that pay dividends than firms that make stock 
repurchases.  
Regarding the firm- specific control variables, as expected the coefficients of the 
variables ACCR(-1) (0.0987 in column 2, 0.1014 in column 4 and 0.0981 in column 6), 
REV_GROWTH (8.22E-07 in column 2, 8.93E-07 in column 4 and 8.17E-07 in column 
6) and LEVERAGE (0.0266 in column 2, 0.0279 in column 4 and 0.0262 in column 6) 
are positive and statistically significant. However, the coefficient of the variable 
REV_GROWTH is very close to zero. The signals of the coefficients of ACCR(-1) and 
REV_GROWTH are consistent with He et al. (2017) work. The coefficient of leverage 
supports Deng et al. (2017) research, so doesn´t give support to other related literature 
with contrary results (Daniel et al. 2008; He et al. 2017).  
Also consistent with related studies, the coefficients of SIZE (-0.0097 in column 2, 
-0.0112 in column 4 and -0.0093 in column 6), AGE (-0.0006 in columns 2, -0.0007 in 
column 4 and -0.0005 in column 6), ROA (-0.0437 in column 2, -0.0454 in column 4 and 
-0.0433 in column 6) and PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS (-0.0682 in column 2, -0.0716 in 
column 4 and -0.0696 in column 6) are negative and statistically significant. The 
coefficient of SIZE is consistent with Daniel et al. (2008), Deng et al. (2017) and He et 
al. (2017); the coefficient of AGE is consistent with Deng et al. (2017) and He et al. 
(2017) and the coefficients of ROA and  PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS give support to He et al. 
(2017) results.  
In conclusion larger firms, older firms, firms with higher profitability and long-term 
tangible assets are associated with lower earnings management. The positive relation 
between past and present earnings management is verified, meaning that is a tendency for 
firms engage in earnings management that is smaller or lower for each company. 
Regarding the coefficient of REV_GROWTH, this evidence that the magnitude of sales 
growth has a very small impact on the incentive to manipulate earnings. For last, firms 
with higher leverage ratios are associated with more earnings manipulation, meaning that 
the possible increase in agency conflicts more than offset the possible effect of restrictions 
on earnings manipulation through covenants associated to debt contracts.  
The coefficients of BM and CO are not significant, meaning that, contrary to the 
expected based on related studies (Deng et al. 2017; He et al. 2017), the Book-to-market 
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equity ratio and the fraction of shares closely held by insiders and controlling shareholders 
have no impact on earnings management activities. 
Table 6: Payout policy and earnings management 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 0.1721*** 0.2745*** 0.1293*** 0.2788*** 0.1817*** 0.2734*** 
 46.2424 29.3320 39.2964 29.1940 46.6829 28.6155 
DIV -0.0746*** -0.0314*** 
  -0.0697*** -0.0307*** 
 -27.8644 -11.5928 
  -24.7867 -11.0037 
REP 
  -0.0360*** -0.0107*** -0.0220*** -0.0074*** 
 
  -14.8692 -4.6868 -8.9082 -3.2070 
ACCR(-1) 
 0.0987***  0.1014***  0.0981*** 
 
 21.9370  22.3102  21.5450 
SIZE 
 -0.0097***  -0.0112***  -0.0093*** 
 
 -14.8038  -17.2256  -13.7454 
BM 
 -0.0006  -0.0003  -0.0006 
 
 -0.7362  -0.3101  -0.6968 
REV_GROWTH 
 8.22E-07*  8.93E-07*  8.17E-07* 
 
 1.7516  1.8894  1.7315 
AGE 
 -0.0006***  -0.0007***  -0.0005*** 
 
 -5.7844  -6.6364  -5.3795 
LEVERAGE 
 0.0266***  0.0279***  0.0262*** 
 
 8.1357  8.4229  7.9108 
ROA 
 -0.0437***  -0.0454***  -0.0433*** 
 
 -14.8749  -15.3686  -14.6405 
CO 
 3.53E-05  8.3E-06  3.15E-05 
 
 0.6792  -0.1556  0.5899 
PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS 
 -0.0682***  -0.0716***  -0.0696*** 
 
 -12.4278  -12.7688  -12.4100 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.07465 0.13945 0.06262 0.13648 0.07660 0.13976 
Adjusted R-squared 0.07410 0.13858 0.06204 0.13558 0.07601 0.13884 
F-statistic 134.95320 160.10810 108.71220 151.96300 129.63290 151.42670 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
This table present the OLS estimates of model (3) (in column 1, without firm-specific control variables and in column 2) , model 
(4) (in column 3, without firm-specific control variables and in column 4) and model (5) (in column 5, without firm-specific 
control variables and in column 6). The dependent variable of all models, ACCRi,t, is a measure for earnings management for 
firm i in year t obtained from the absolute values of the residuals of the equation (1). The independent variables related to payout 
policy are DIVi,t, which is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm i pays dividends in year t, and 0 otherwise and REP i,t 
that is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a firm makes stock repurchases in year t, and 0 otherwise. The firm-specific control 
variables include the lagged value of dependent variable (ACCR(-1)), firm size (SIZE), the log of book-to-market equity ratio 
(BM), revenues growth (REV_GROWTH), firm age (AGE), firm leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), Closely-
held ownership (CO) and long-term tangible assets (PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS). All firm-specific control variables are defined on 
Appendix A- Table A1. In all models are included fixed effects for country, industry and year. Coefficient values are listed at 
bold and blow them are the t-statistics.  
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Regarding the frequency of payouts, the column 1 of table 7 compares firms that 
pay dividends in a regular way with firms that pay dividends with an occasional 
frequency. The coefficients of REV_DIV (-0.1089) and OCCAS_DIV (-0.0866) are both 
significantly negatives, which reinforces hypothesis 1.  
However, the absolute value of the coefficient of REV_DIV is higher than the 
absolute value of the coefficient of OCCAS_DIV, confirming that firms that make regular 
payouts are less inclined to manage earnings than firms that make occasional payouts 
(hypothesis 4). This result is in line with the expectation of firms that make regular 
payouts be more effective in reducing agency problems because these firms have a 
historically greater commitment with minority shareholders, which limits their 
opportunistic behavior. Skinner and Soltes (2011) compared the impact of regular payouts 
and occasional payouts on earnings persistence and also found better results for firms that 
make regular payouts than firms that make occasional payouts.  
The column 2 of table 7 presents a similar comparison between firms that make 
regular repurchases and firms that make occasional repurchases. The hypothesis 2 is also 
reinforced because the coefficients of REG_REP (-0.0705) and OCCAS_REP (-0.0461) 
are negatives and statistically significant. Regarding the hypothesis 4 is confirmed again 
because the absolute value of the coefficient of REG_REP is bigger than the absolute 
value of the coefficient of OCCAS_REP.  
In relation the columns 3 and 4 of table 7, these four coefficients are analyzed 
together (REG_DIV, OCCAS_DIV, REG_REP AND OCCAS_REP). The hypotheses 1 
and 2 are confirmed again because the coefficients of these four variables are significantly 
negatives. The hypothesis 4 is also confirmed because the absolute value of the coefficient 
of REG_DIV (-0.0942 in column 3 and -0.0410 in column 4) is higher than the absolute 
value of the coefficient of OCCAS_DIV (-0.0779 in column 3 and -0.0390 in column 4) 
and the absolute value of the coefficient of REG_REP (-0.0402 in column 3 and -0.0174 
in column 4) is higher than the absolute value of the coefficient of OCCAS_REP (-0.0271 
in column 3 and -0.0167 in column 4). Another important conclusion is the reinforce of 
hypothesis 3 (firms that pay dividends are less inclined to manage earnings than firms 
that make stock repurchases) because the absolute value of the coefficient of REG_DIV 
is higher than the absolute value of REG_REP and the absolute value of the coefficient 
of OCCAS_DIV is higher than the absolute value of the coefficient of OCCAS_REP.  
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The column 4 of table 7 is different from column 3 because includes the firm 
specific control variables. The conclusions for these variables are similar to the results 
obtained on table 6, except for the coefficient of REV_GROWTH that is not statistically 
significant. In conclusion, the small positive impact of revenues growth on earnings 
management is not significant. 
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  Table 7: Regular and occasional payouts and earnings management 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 0.2033*** 0.1612*** 0.2225*** 0.2875*** 
 48.5508 40.9023 48.8599 30.4251 
REG_DIV -0.1089*** 
 -0.0942*** -0.0410*** 
 -31.0154 
 -25.1502 -10.9696 
OCCAS_DIV -0.0866*** 
 -0.0779*** -0.0390*** 
 -26.6796 
 -23.3645 -11.9248 
REG_REP 
 -0.0705*** -0.0402*** -0.0174*** 
 
 -21.0419 -11.3404 -5.1608 
OCCAS_REP 
 -0.0461*** -0.0271*** -0.0167*** 
 
 -14.4456 -8.3589 -5.5197 
ACCR(-1) 
   0.0970*** 
 
   21.5946 
SIZE 
   -0.0090* 
 
   -13.4429 
BM 
   -0.0004 
 
   -0.4555 
REV_GROWTH 
   7.41E-07 
 
   1.5819 
AGE 
   -0.0005*** 
 
   -5.3422 
LEVERAGE 
   0.0287*** 
 
   8.7040 
ROA 
   -0.0402*** 
 
   -13.6297 
CO 
   4.06E-05 
 
   0.7785 
PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS 
   -0.0662*** 
 
   -12.0503 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.07959 0.06728 0.08241 0.14177 
Adjusted R-squared 0.07902 0.06671 0.08180 0.14082 
F-statistic 139.41990 116.31110 134.46210 149.83840 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
This table present the OLS estimates of model 6 (in column 1, 2 and 3 without firm-specific control variables 
and in column 4 the complete model). The dependent variable of all models, ACCR i,t, is a measure for 
earnings management for firm i in year t obtained from the absolute values of the residuals of the equation 
(1). The independent variables related to payout policy are the dummy variables REG_DIV, which takes the 
value 1 if the firm pay regular dividends, and 0 otherwise; OCCAS_DIV, that takes the value 1 if the firm 
pay occasional dividends, and 0 otherwise; REG_REP, if which takes the value 1 if the firm makes regular 
repurchases, and 0 otherwise and OCCAS_REP, that takes the value 1 if the firm makes occasional 
repurchases, and 0 otherwise. The firm-specific control variables include the lagged value of dependent 
variable (ACCR(-1)), firm size (SIZE), the log of book-to-market equity ratio (BM), revenues growth 
(REV_GROWTH), firm age  (AGE), firm leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), Closely-
held ownership (CO) and long-term tangible assets (PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS). All firm-specific control 
variables are defined on Appendix A- Table A1. In all models are included fixed effects for country, industry 
and year. Coefficient values are listed at bold and blow theme are the t-statistics.  
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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The impact of the degree of investor protection of countries is studied on table 8. 
The column 1 and 2 focus on the impact of weaker or strong investor protection in the 
countries in the relationship between DIV and ACCR. The absolute value of coefficient 
of LAW*DIV (-0.0933 in column 1 and -0.0451 in column 2) is bigger than the absolute 
value of the coefficient of (1-LAW)*DIV (-0.0737 in column 1 and -0.0297). The values 
of these coefficients mean that there is a negative relationship between firms that pay 
dividends and earnings management that is more pronounced in civil law countries, which 
generally are countries with weaker investor protection, thus confirming hypothesis 5. 
This result is consistent with He et al. (2017) results.  
The results of columns 3 and 4 of table 8 confirm that firms that pay dividends are 
less inclined to engage in earnings manipulation activities than firms that make stock 
repurchases, especially in countries with weaker investor protection (hypothesis 6), which 
is consistent with He et al. (2017) findings. This result is suggested because the value of 
coefficient LAW*DIV (-0.0949 in column 3 and -0.0461 in column 4) is statistically 
significant and negative but the coefficient of LAW*REP is insignificant (-0.0151 in 
column 3 and significant but insignificant in column 4, which is the column with the 
complete model), this suggest that in civil law countries firms that pay dividends are less 
prone to manage earnings but stock repurchases has no significant impact on earnings 
management. In contrary, the coefficients of (1-LAW)*REP (-0.0408 in column 3 and -
0.0129 in column 4) and (1-LAW)*DIV (-0.0631 in column 3 and -0.0279 in column 4) 
are both negatives and statistically significant and the coefficient of (1-LAW)*DIV is 
higher in absolute value than the coefficient of (1-LAW)*REP , which suggest than in 
common law countries both the payment of dividends and stock repurchases are 
associated with the reduction of earnings manipulation activities but firms that pay 
dividends are less prone to manage earnings than firms that make repurchases. 
The coefficients of the firm-specific control variables that are included in column 2 
and 4 of table 8 give us the same conclusions that in table 6.  
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Table 8: Investor protection and earnings management 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 0.2015*** 0.2997*** 0.2114*** 0.2958*** 
 70.6314 35.6740 71.1269 34.4859 
LAW*DIV -0.0933*** -0.0451*** -0.0949*** -0.0461*** 
 -34.7870 -16.0257 -28.6277 -13.7030 
LAW*REP 
  -0.0151*** -0.0026 
 
  -4.6278 -0.8797 
(1-LAW)*DIV -0.0737*** -0.0297*** -0.0631*** -0.0279*** 
 -24.0029 -9.8547 -19.2500 -8.9060 
(1-LAW)*REP 
  -0.0408*** -0.0129*** 
 
  -12.1619 -3.9820 
ACCR(-1) 
 0.1004***  0.0989*** 
 
 22.3047  21.7239 
SIZE 
 -0.0099***  -0.0094*** 
 
 -16.0880  -14.4175 
BM 
 -0.0010  -0.0010 
 
 -1.2352  -1.1687 
REV_GROWTH 
 9.09E-07*  8.32E-07* 
 
 1.9283  1.7610 
AGE 
 -0.0006***  -0.0006*** 
 
 -6.6832  -6.0226 
LEVERAGE 
 0.0242***  0.0244*** 
 
 7.4058  7.3908 
ROA 
 -0.0434***  -0.0435*** 
 
 -14.7256  -14.6688 
CO 
 -7.70E-05  -8.16E-05 
 
 -1.5607  -1.5884 
PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS 
 -0.0677***  -0.0690*** 
 
 -12.4131  -12.4167 
Country FE No No No No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.06988 0.13203 0.07385 0.13858 
Adjusted R-squared 0.06939 0.13150 0.07330 0.13771 
F-statistic 142.83040 248.08210 134.99190 159.32340 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
This table present the OLS estimates of model (7) (in column 1, without firm-specific control variables and in column 2) 
and model (8) (in column 3, without firm-specific control variables and in column 4). The dependent variable of all models, 
ACCRi,t, is a measure for earnings management for firm i in year t+1 obtained from the absolute values of the residuals of 
the equation (1). The key independent variables are the interaction between LAWi,t and DIVi,t (LAWi,t*DIVi,t ), the interaction 
between LAWi,t and REPi,t (LAWi,t*REPi,t ), the interaction between (1-LAWi,t) and DIVi,t ((1-LAWi,t)*DIVi,t ) and the 
interaction between (1-LAWi,t) and REPi,t ((1-LAWi,t)*REPi,t ), where DIVi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm 
i pays dividends in year t, and 0 otherwise, REPi,t that is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a firm makes stock repurchases 
in year t, and 0 otherwise and LAWi,t is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the firms is from a civil law country 
and zero otherwise. The firm-specific control variables include the lagged value of dependent variable (ACCR(-1)), firm 
size (SIZE), the log of book-to-market equity ratio (BM), revenues growth (REV_GROWTH), firm age (AGE), firm 
leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), Closely-held ownership (CO) and long-term tangible assets 
(PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS). All firm-specific control variables are defined on Appendix A- Table A1. In all models are included 
fixed effects for industry and year. Coefficient values are listed at bold and blow theme are the t-statistics.  
 ***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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4.3. Robustness tests: Alternative measures of payout policy  
In order to reinforce our key hypothesis (hypothesis 1), we replace the variable DIV 
for two alternative forms of payout policy, dividend payout ratio and dividend-price ratio 
(Daniel et al. 2008; Deng et al. 2017; He et al. 2017).  
In columns 1 and 2 of table 9 we find a statistically negative association between 
dividend-payout ratio and earnings management (not statistically significant in column 1 
but significant in column 2 (-0.3089), which is the column with the complete model) and 
in columns 3 and 4 we find a statistically negative association between dividend-price 
ratio and earnings management (-0.009 in column 3 and -0.004 in column 4), reinforcing 
the hypothesis 1. 
The results of the firm-specific variables, columns 2 and 4, are also confirmed.  
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Table 9: Alternative measures of payout policy 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 0,1071*** 0,2811*** 0,120*** 0,277*** 
 36,8555 29,8120 42,882 29,675 
DIV_PAYOUT -0,0465 -0,3089** 
  
 -0,2888 -1,9791 
  
DIV_PRICE 
  -0,009*** -0,004*** 
 
  -15,943 -8,176 
ACCR(-1) 
 0,1024***  0,101*** 
 
 22,7223  22,462 
SIZE 
 -0,0119***  -0,011*** 
 
 -18,8976  -17,972 
BM 
 -0,0002  9,32E-05 
 
 -0,2789  0,114 
REV_GROWTH 
 9,03E-07*  8,60E-07* 
 
 1,9187  1,830 
AGE 
 -0,0007***  -0,001*** 
 
 -7,1337  -6,517 
LEVERAGE 
 0,0293***  0,029*** 
 
 8,8886  8,782 
ROA 
 -0,0454***  -0,045*** 
 
 -15,4084  -15,356 
CO 
 7,52E-06  8,09E-06 
 
 0,1437  0,156 
PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS 
 -0,0693***  -0,069*** 
 
 -12,5475  -12,664 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0,058161 0,135497 0,06714 0,13767 
Adjusted R-squared 0,05759 0,134615 0,06657 0,13680 
F-statistic 101,9777 153,5382 118,46990 157,99650 
Prob. (F-statistic) 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 0,00000 
This table present the OLS estimates of a modified model (3) replacing the variable DIVi,t by two 
alternatives measures, DIV_PAYOUT (in column 1, without firm-specific control variables and in 
column 2) and DIV_PRICE (in column 3, without firm-specific control variables and in column 4). The 
variable DIV_PAYOUT is defined as dividends per share scaled by net income and DIV_PRICE is 
defined as dividends per share scaled by stock price. The dependent variable of all models, ACCR i,t, is a 
measure for earnings management for firm i in year t obtained from the absolute values of the residuals 
of the equation (1). The firm-specific control variables include the lagged value of dependent variable 
(ACCR(-1)), firm size (SIZE), the log of book-to-market equity ratio (BM), revenues growth 
(REV_GROWTH), firm age (AGE), firm leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), return on assets (ROA), Closely-
held ownership (CO) and long-term tangible assets (PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS). All firm-specific control 
variables are defined on Appendix A- Table A1. In all models are included fixed effects for country, 
industry and year. Coefficient values are listed at bold and blow theme are the t-statistics.  
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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5. Conclusions 
This dissertation focuses on the relationship between payout policy and earnings 
management. The relationship between dividends and earnings management has been 
widely studied by related literature (Daniel et al. 2008; He et al. 2017). However, the 
crescent importance of stock repurchases on payout structure over the last years (Skinner 
2008; von Eije and Megginson 2008; Haw et al. 2011; Fatemi and Bildik 2012) has given 
a new highlight on this theme, therefore we also analyzed the relationship between stock 
repurchases and earnings management. Following that, we attempt to make a detailed 
comparison of the impact of these two forms of payout. Additionally, we compare the 
payout structure of the companies based on the frequency of payments and the differences 
in the relationship between earnings management and the two forms of payout in civil 
law countries and in common law countries.  
For the referred goals, we use a data sample of firms from the five world's leading 
industrialized countries (France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States) 
for the recent period of 2005-2015. We measure earnings management based on a 
modified Jones (1991) abnormal accruals model and estimate all regressions that analyze 
the relationship between earnings management and the other variables using OLS. 
As expected, we found a negative relationship between dividends and earnings 
management and between repurchases and earnings management, however this 
association is stronger to firms that pay dividends than firms that make stock repurchases. 
This suggest that dividends are more effective in resolve agency conflicts than stock 
repurchases. The negative relationship between dividends and earnings management is 
confirmed in all regressions estimated and is reinforced in robustness tests when two 
alternative measures of dividend policy are employed. 
In a more detailed analysis, we divide the two forms of payout (repurchases and 
dividends) based on the frequency and found that firms that make regular payouts are less 
inclined to manage earnings than firms that make occasional payouts. This result confirms 
that these firms have a historically greater commitment with minority shareholders, which 
limits their opportunistic behavior.  
In relation to the study of the differences between civil law countries and common 
law countries, we found that the negative relationship between firms that pay dividends 
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is more pronounced in civil law countries, because these are generally countries with 
weaker investor protection so are more susceptible to agency conflicts (La Porta et al. 
2000). In relation to stock repurchases, we find that in civil law countries have no 
significant impact and in common law countries confirms that firms that pay dividends 
are less prone to manage earnings than firms that make stock repurchases.  
We also found that larger firms are associated with lower earnings management, 
which is consistent with larger firms having generally more audit quality and reputation 
in the market. Older firms also are associated with lower earnings management, 
suggesting that generally these firms have already resolved or reduced the agency 
conflicts. Additionally, we also found that firms with higher profitability and long-term 
tangible assets are associated with lower earnings management. 
In relation to the incentives to earnings manipulation we found the past earnings 
management and higher leverage ratios. These findings suggest a tendency for engage in 
earnings management activities that may be smaller or larger for each company and that 
the possible increase in agency conflicts with higher leverage ratio more than offset the 
possible effect of restrictions on earnings manipulation through covenants associated to 
debt contracts.  
Contrary to the expected based on related studies (Deng et al. 2017; He et al. 2017), 
we conclude that the growth of revenues, the book-to-market equity ratio and the fraction 
of shares closely held by insiders and controlling shareholders have no impact on earnings 
management activities. 
These findings are important for all users of information because the manipulation 
of earnings can have a huge impact on real economy and financial markets and this 
dissertation gives evidence on the determinants of earnings management, especially the 
repurchases and dividends. These results are also helpful on the payout structure choice 
because result from a detailed comparison between repurchases and dividends in relation 
to the effectiveness on reduce agency conflicts and the impact on earnings management. 
The main limitation of our study is that we do not extend the analysis of investor 
protection to other measures besides the legal tradition of the country.  
This dissertation extends related studies because use a different sample of countries 
in a more recent period to make a more detailed comparison between repurchases and 
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dividends. This theme still has many possible developments. First, the detailed 
comparison of repurchases and dividends can be extended to the impact in other measures 
like earnings persistence, earnings quality and earnings informativeness. Second, a 
sample with more countries could allow a deeper analysis of different measures of 
investor protection or a comparison between developed and emerging countries. Third, 
study the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in earnings management and 
compare European countries with other countries.  
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Table A. 1: Firm- specific control variables 
Variable Definition Expected sign 
ACCR(-1) Lagged abnormal accruals, measured as the lagged value of abnormal accruals 
obtained from the discretionary accruals model.  
+ 
 SIZE Firm size that is valuated trough the natural logarithm of total assets. - 
BM Log of book-to-market equity ratio, where book-to-market equity ratio = (book 
value of equity/market value of equity) and book value of equity is measured as 
the difference between total assets and total liabilities.  
- 
REV_GROWTH Revenues growth is measured as the sales or revenues in year t less sales or 
revenues in year t-1 scaled by sales or revenues in year t-1. 
+ 
AGE Firm age is measured as the number of years since a firm is included on 
Datastream.  
- 
LEVERAGE Leverage is calculated as total liabilities/ total assets.  +/- 
ROA Return on assets, which is calculated as net income before extra items/preferred 
dividends scaled by total assets. 
- 
CO Closely-held ownership. This variable represents the fraction of shares closely held 
by insiders and controlling shareholders. 
+ 
PPE/TOTAL_ASSETS Net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets.  - 
 
This table presents the definition of control variables and the expected signs according to the related literate as described on section 3.2.5. 
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